Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity
研究了在重复多选项协调博弈中，结合渐进性和内生性（GEAD机制）如何提升协调成功率，并通过实验验证其有效性，对解决现实中的协调失败问题有参考价值。
Abstract We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.