既往医疗支出与保险公司质量竞争下的风险分担

Prior Health Expenditures and Risk Sharing with Insurers Competing on Quality

RAND Journal of Economics · 2003
被引 17
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究保险公司如何利用风险调整类别内的异质性进行风险选择,并分析在保险公司质量竞争下,使用既往支出作为风险调整因子总能提高社会福利。

Abstract

Insurers can exploit the heterogeneity within risk-adjustment classes to select the good risks because they have more information than the regulator on the expected expenditures of individual insurees. To counteract this cream skimming, mixed systems combining capitation and cost-based payments have been adopted that do not, however, generally use the past expenditures of insurees as a risk adjuster. In this article, two symmetric insurers compete for clients by differentiating the quality of service offered to them according to some private information about their risk. In our setting it is always welfare improving to use prior expenditures as a risk adjuster.

风险调整撇脂行为混合支付质量竞争