Internal versus External Capital Markets
分析内部资本市场与银行借贷等外部融资方式的成本与收益，指出内部资本的所有权属性带来更多监督、削弱经理创业激励、并便于重新配置不良项目资产。
This paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation. We focus primarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending. While both represent centralized forms of financing, in the former case the financing is owner-provided, while in the latter case it is not. We argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences: (1) it leads to more monitoring than bank lending; (2) it reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives; and (3) it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management.