Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry
研究有线电视行业节目制作与传输的垂直整合，发现整合运营商倾向于排斥竞争对手的节目，但垂直整合因效率提升并未损害消费者福利，甚至可能有益。
I examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry. I assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings, prices, and subscriptions, and I compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets. The results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions. First, integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services, suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators. Second, vertical integration does not harm, and may actually benefit, consumers because of the associated efficiency gains.