Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs
基于1982-87年美国大型商业银行CEO数据，发现新聘CEO薪酬对资产的弹性约三分之一，续任CEO薪酬变化与股票及会计业绩挂钩，且业绩对离职概率的影响随年龄变化。
A new data set covers chief executive officers (CEOs) of large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. For continuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance, as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay to performance diminishes with experience, but the returns are not filtered for peer-group returns. Logit regressions relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance, as measured by stock returns filtered for peer-group returns; CEO experience does not influence this relationship. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.