The Incredible Volcker Disinflation
用简单宏观模型分析1980-1984年沃尔克反通胀，发现其实际效果主要源于政策可信度不足，长期利率的顽固是重要证据，并基于美联储会议记录证实决策者当时也有类似看法。
The change in inflation that occurred during 1980 through 1984, when the Federal Reserve System was headed by Paul Volcker, is arguably the most widely discussed and visible macroeconomic event of the last 50 years of U.S. macroeconomic history. Prior to this time, inflation had been dramatically rising, but under Volcker, the Federal Reserve System first contained and then reversed this process. Using a simple modern macroeconomic model as an organizing principle, we argue that the real effects of the Volcker disinflation were mainly due to its imperfect credibility. In our analysis, the observed stubbornness of long-term interest rates over the course of the disinflation is a key indicator of imperfect credibility. Studying the transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee during 1979 and 1980, as released to the public within the last year, we find — to our surprise — that Volcker and other participants in the monetary policy process considered the period in similar terms, using the long-term interest rate as an indicator of inflationary expectations and of