Cooperatives as Entrants
提出消费者联盟（合作社）作为潜在进入者，比较其与营利性进入者对市场的影响，发现两者在战略互动上有显著差异，合作社可能有益地调节自由市场表现。
A potential shortcoming of game-theoretic models in industrial organization is their failure to consider consumers as players. We introduce a customer coalition-a cooperative-as a potential entrant and compare the cooperative entry threat with that posed by the usualforprofit entrant. We identify four fundamental distinctions between cooperative andfor-profit entrants and demonstrate that the strategic interplay between a cooperative and an incumbent firm may differ markedly from that between the incumbent and a for-profit entrant. The results impart a prospectively powerful role to potential cooperatives in beneficially regulating free-market performance.