Foresight and Public Utility Regulation
建立模型分析理性预期和有效市场如何影响公共事业监管，考察投资者预期与监管行为的反馈效应，并评估允许收益率与资本成本偏差、不同预期增长率的影响，为监管决策对资源错配和激励的影响提供结论。
This paper develops a model that shows the effects of rational expectations, and of efficient mark ets, on public utility regulation. It is shown that the feedback from investor expectations to regulatory behavior, together with investor expectations that take account of this feedback, basically alters th e consequences of regulatory decisions. The analysis examines the eff ects of a deviation between the allowed rate of return and the cost o f capital, with both perfect and imperfect investor foresight. It als o assesses the consequences of differing expected growth rates. Concl usions are drawn for the effects of regulatory decisions on resource misallocation and of regulatory lag on incentives. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.