Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible? A comment
评论了Cummings等人（1997）的实验证据，该证据拒绝假设性公投是激励相容机制的假设，并指出在实验环境中，当涉及真实金钱时，受访者的行为不同。
In a recent article in this Journal, Cummings al. (1997) offer experimental evidence rejecting the hypothesis that a hypothetical referendum is an incentive‐compatible mechanism for obtaining the social value of, or willingness to pay for, changes in the allocation of environmental goods and services. While cautions in offering a blanket rejection of hypothetical referenda as a means of measuring economic values on the basis of their findings, the authors do suggest that at least in experimental settings respondents appear to behave differently when real money is changing hands. Wheather hypothetical situations adequately mimic real‐market situations has been debated in the contigent valuation literature since its inception (see Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986). Cummings et al.'s finding of incentive incompatibility appears to offer strong evidence for the critics of hypothetical referenda.