Induced Institutional Change or Transaction Costs? The Economic Logic of Land Reallocations in Chinese Agriculture
通过村庄调查数据，分析中国农村土地调整类型（部分或大规模）受交易成本影响，而非诱致性制度变迁理论所强调的产权安全。
The communal land rights system in China, which combines individualised farming with periodic land reallocations, provides a good case for testing the economic logic of land reallocations. Analysis of the results of a unique village survey reveals that a village's choice of land reallocation type - partial or large in scale - is significantly affected by transaction cost considerations, which vary according to village topography and size, rather than concerns for economic efficiency (tenure security), the latter of which is a proxy for the theory of induced institutional change. More specifically, villages with complex topographies tend to favour partial land reallocation, whereas larger settlements tend to reallocate land more thoroughly.