A THEORY OF MONEY AND MARKETPLACES*
研究一个无限重复经济，其中使用可分割法定货币，代理人选择进入不同市场进行随机匹配交易，发现存在多种稳态均衡，但只有高效的单一定价均衡是演化稳定的。
This article considers an infinitely repeated economy with divisible fiat money. The economy has many marketplaces that agents choose to visit. In each marketplace, agents are randomly matched to trade goods. There exist a variety of stationary equilibria. In some equilibrium, each good is traded at a single price, whereas in another, every good is traded at two different prices. There is a continuum of such equilibria, which differ from each other in price and welfare levels. However, it is shown that only the efficient single‐price equilibrium is evolutionarily stable.