Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
基于Phillip Nelson的思想，构建了一个信号模型，其中新体验品的初始价格和直接“无信息”的广告等消耗性营销支出可作为产品质量的初始不可观测信号，重复购买起关键作用，并展示了在多重信号下精炼均衡的方法。
We present a signaling model, based on ideas of Phillip Nelson, in which both the introductory price and the level of directly "uninformative" advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good. Repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model. A second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals.