Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors
利用储蓄机构的详细利率数据，检验存款人是否对银行风险有市场纪律作用，发现风险更高的银行支付更高利率但吸收更少的未保险存款。
This paper tests for the presence of depositor discipline by examining the effect of depository institutions' risk on the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits. The study analyzes a large panel of thrifts that includes detailed information on interest rate schedules. This information allows the authors to develop a time-consistent risk profile for thrifts. Their empirical findings support the presence of market discipline. Riskier banks are found to pay higher interest rates but attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits. The authors also find that qualitative results are similar for fully insured deposits, although statistical significance is substantially lower.