Lockup and Voluntary Earnings Forecast Disclosure in IPOs
研究新加坡IPO中锁定期长度与自愿盈利预测披露的关系，发现预测者更愿接受较长锁定期以增强预测可信度，且锁定期促使公司发布保守预测。
We examine the relation between lockup length and voluntary earnings forecast disclosures for IPOs in Singapore. Unlike firms in the United States, companies in Singapore are allowed to provide earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses. We find that forecasters are more likely to accept longer lockup periods, so that the lockup expires after the first post‐IPO earnings announcement. Our study also shows that because the lockup agreement removes personal incentives to issue aggressive forecasts, IPO firms tend to issue conservative forecasts. Overall, our results suggest that the lockup mechanism adds credibility to the earnings forecast given in the IPO prospectus.