The Argumentational Texture of Transaction Cost Economics
用解构方法分析威廉姆森的《资本主义经济制度》，发现机会主义假设既引发经济组织问题，又削弱其解决方案，统一治理的可行性依赖于暂时搁置该假设，使理论陷入逻辑困境。
The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the problem of economic organization as formulated by William son also tends to undermine the proposed solution to this problem. The plausi bility of unified governance as a solution to the problem of opportunism in transaction relations with asset specificity is shown to hinge on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be both opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be main tained.