Commodity Price Stabilization in Imperfect or Cartelized Markets
研究当市场存在垄断或卡特尔时，商品价格稳定策略的选择，发现线性需求下主导生产者比完全竞争时更倾向于稳定价格，且市场份额越大价格越稳定。
Most studies of commodity price stabilization assume that all agents behave competitively. However, many commodities suitable for stockpiling are produced by countries with a significant share of the world market, and commodity agreements themselves often result in cartelization of the market. The paper explores the consequences of market power for the choice of storage rule and the degree of price stabilization. It finds that with linear demand, dominant producers choose more stable prices than under perfect competition and price stability increases with their market share. With constant elastic demand the competitive degree of price stabilization is achieved.