Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources
将描述捕捞规则合规的复制者动态与资源存量动态结合，研究监管下合规行为的演化，发现长期均衡中合作与非合作规则可共存，低存量时审计概率结构可能导致极限环。
Abstract The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long‐run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non‐cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.