Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions
构建了一个两期模型，分析现任雇主因掌握经理实际绩效信息而拥有优势，外部雇主仅能观察到任务分配，导致最优合同刚性、经理市场价值低于实际生产率且晋升不足，并解释了任务内工资差异小、任务间差异大的现象。
A two-period model of managerial task assignment is developed, where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager, while outside employers can observe only the assign ments. Optimal contracts are rigid, but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient. The author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e. As a consequence, the model has the appealing property of small ab ility-based wage differentials within a task, as well as large ones b etween tasks. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.