Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning
研究保险公司和消费者在重复保险中共同学习未知风险类型的过程，发现最优长期合同下年轻人受老年人补贴，且低风险者反向经验评级；与短期竞争合同相比，后者可能导致过度投资于谨慎行为。
This article considers a repeated insurance model with incomplete information in which the insurer and the consumer both learn over time about the unknown risk category of the consumer. Care choices by young consumers affect the informational value of the accident history. Under an optimal scheme of long-term insurance contracts, young consumers will always be subsidized by old consumers, and consumers who are reassessed as low-risk types are always subsidizers (i.e., reverse experience ratings). We compare this optimal scheme with the set of contracts that would emerge in a competitive market if only short-term contracting were possible. These sequentially competitive contracts can lead to over-investment in care by both young and old consumers, relative to the optimum, in contrast to the underinvestment problem associated with moral hazard in insurance.