A Selectivity Model of Household Food Marketing Behavior in Sub‐Saharan Africa
区分家庭是否参与粗粮市场的离散决策和参与后买卖多少的连续决策，发现高固定交易成本导致不参与市场，并用样本选择模型纠正不可观测变量造成的偏差。
Abstract The agricultural household's discrete decision of whether to participate in coarse grain markets is separated here from the continuous decision of how much to sell or buy, conditional on participation. Failure to participate in markets results from high fixed transactions costs. A selectivity model endogenously switches households into alternative market participation states, correcting for bias caused by the exclusion of unobservable variables affecting both discrete and continuous decisions. Improved market information increases the probability of participation by sellers, while access to cereals‐processing technology increases quantities transacted by both sellers and buyers, conditional on participation.