Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents
研究多代理人情境下，风险厌恶的代理人在观察到共同信号后与委托人再谈判的影响，发现再谈判可将执行成本降至最优水平，且委托人只需使用简单初始契约。
We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations\nwhere risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after the\nagents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. We\nshow that renegotiation with multiple agents reduces the cost of implementing\nany implementable action profile down to the first-best level, even though the\nprincipal cannot observe the agents’ actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the\nprincipal to use a “simple” initial contract, in the sense that it consists of no\nmore than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments to the\nagents are the same regardless of the realised state. An important implication is\nthat decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiation and proposals from\nthe agents, can be as effective as centralized schemes that utilize revelation\nmechanisms in unrestricted ways.