Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look
复制并压力测试了Eckel和Grossman（2003）的发现，即匹配补贴比理论上可比的退税补贴能产生更高的慈善收入，并探究了其背后的行为机制。
Abstract This article replicates and “stress tests” a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable rebate subsidies. In a first replication treatment, we show that most choices are consist with a “constant (gross) contribution” rule, suggesting that inattention to the subsidies’ differing net consequences may explain the higher revenues elicited with matching subsidies. Results of additional treatments suggest that (a) the charity dimension of the decision problems has little to do with the result, and (b) extra information regarding the net consequences of decisions reduces but does not eliminate the result.