Did Glass-Steagall Increase the Cost of External Finance for Corporate Investment?: Evidence From Bank and Insurance Company Affiliations
研究发现格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案可能提高了企业为投资筹集外部资金的成本，通过比较法案实施前后与金融机构有关联的公司和无关联公司的投资行为，发现法案前关联公司的投资不受内部流动性影响。
The Glass-Steagall Act may have increased the cost for corporations of raising external funds for investment spending. Significant differences are found in the way financial institutions influenced corporate investment spending. Investment regressions for a sample of companies affiliated to financial institutions are estimated and compared to those for a control sample. Prior to Glass-Steagall, affiliated companies do not display any sensitivity between investment spending and internal measures of liquidity, whereas the control sample does.