De novo venture strategy: arch incumbency at inaugural entry
研究新创企业如何通过选择与主导在位者重叠的市场并采取激进进入或差异化定位，来降低被报复的风险，从而提高生存概率，基于欧洲航空业数据验证。
Abstract By definition, de novo industry ventures do not share many market‐contact points with incumbents—itself an important source of competitive ‘stability’ through mutual forbearance. As such, these ventures are often subject to aggressive retaliation at the outset, which could threaten their very survival. In this study, the notion of an arch incumbent is developed, hypothesizing that, in general, a large market overlap with an incumbent lowers the survival odds of a de novo entrant. However, a large market overlap with the arch incumbent combined with an aggressive inaugural market entry or a different market positioning reduces the probability of retaliation by the arch incumbent (and subsequently other incumbents as well), and hence increases the probability of survival for a de novo entrant. The empirical experience of de novo ventures in the intra‐European passenger airline industry supports these hypotheses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.