Entry Deterrence in the Commons
分析一个现有企业面对潜在进入者时，如何通过降低资源存量来阻止对方进入，并探讨这种策略对福利的影响。
The authors analyze a common property resource model with a single incumbent firm that faces future potential entry of a rival. The cost of harvest from the resource is a function of the stock size. By drawing down current stock sufficiently, which lowers future stock, the incumbent can make entry unprofitable. The authors analyze the conditions under which the incumbent firm would deter entry and when entry would be allowed. Further, they analyze the effect that potential entry has on the harvest rate both before and after the date of potential entry and whether or not potential entry is welfare improving. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.