Understanding the Role of Worker Interdependence in Team Selection
通过计算模拟评估了将相互依赖的工人分配到团队的不同政策，发现基于工人协作效果的分配优于基于个人绩效的公平分配，并为管理者提供了组建团队的建议。
In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of policies for assigning interdependent workers to teams. Using a computational simulation, we contrast distributing workers equitably across teams based on prior individual performance with policies that distribute workers based on how well people work together. First, we test a policy that clusters workers into teams by finding natural breakpoints among them where their mutual support is weak. Then we test two other policies that both protect the strongest interdependent core of high performers but differ in that one policy separates workers who give little support to interdependent partners and the other separates workers who receive little support from their partners. All three policies outperform the equitable-distribution approach in some circumstances. We make recommendations to managers for harnessing interdependence when forming teams, whether the managers are familiar or unfamiliar with how well their people work together.