Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply
刻画了当逆向选择问题紧随道德风险问题时，委托人与风险中性且受财富约束的代理人之间的最优契约，发现该契约在最高产出水平上比标准情形更陡峭，以激励代理人在获取信息前后均付出大量努力。
We characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk‐neutral, wealth‐constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting. The large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment.