Bidding for Horizontal Multinationals
建立模型分析政府通过补贴或税收来竞标企业，发现横向跨国公司的存在会减弱竞相降税竞争，并得出与传统结论相反的结果：补贴增加可能降低企业利润，企业可能被征税，补贴可能成为战略独立工具。
We present a model in which governments bid for firms by taxing/subsidizing setup costs. Firms choose both the number and the location of the plants they operate, and the equilibrium industry structure is affected by governmentsâ subsidy choices. We show that the endogenous presence of horizontal multinationals attenuates the race to the bottom and yields some results that run counter to traditional findings in the literature. First, in the presence of multinationals, increasing subsidies decrease firmsâ profits by exacerbating price competition due to more firms going multinational. Second, instead of being always subsidized, firms may actually be taxed in equilibrium. Last, subsidies may become strategically independent policy instruments, instead of being strategic complements.