Firm‐specific human capital, organizational incentives, and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking
研究发现企业特定人力资本既提升贷款销售效率，也加剧经理人操纵贷款条款以获取更多激励报酬，导致利润下降两个百分点，且高人力资本经理人的利润损失增长更快。
This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital ( FSHC ) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect : FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐ FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐ FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.