Adverse Selection in the Annuities Market and the Impact of Privatizing Social Security
校准了一个美国典型人群的生命周期模型，再现了三个典型事实：逆向选择使年金价格上升7-10%，成本随年龄增长而增加，女性成本低于男性；社会保障私有化可使年金价格降低2-3%。
The observation that few Americans purchase life annuities has often been attributed to adverse selection. A still unanswered question is whether observable price increases caused by adverse selection can be generated endogenously in a life cycle model. This paper calibrates a pure life cycle model for a characteristic US cohort and reproduces three stylized facts. Adverse selection increases annuity prices by 7–10 percent; the cost of adverse selection rises with the age of the annuitant; and the cost is smaller for females than for males. Social security privatization could reduce annuity prices by between 2 and 3 percent.