Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information
建模了劳资双方各自掌握私人信息时的最终报价仲裁，分析其均衡报价行为与仲裁效果，发现仲裁结果能粗略反映案件实质，且管理成本低于追求完美信息的仲裁程序。
In recent years, final-offer arbitration (FOA) has become an increasingly frequent means of resolving labor disputes in the private and public sectors. The present paper models FOA when each disputant has private information bearing on the true value of the case. The model characterizes the disputants' equilibrium offer behavior and examines arbitration performance. The main conclusion is that FOA outcomes are crudely responsive to the underlying merits of the case. In its favor, FOA can be expected to be less costly to administer than arbitration procedures that attempt to extract perfect information.