Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates
构建了一个货币危机模型，其中交易者信息异质，利率在理性预期均衡中内生决定。研究发现利率在资产市场配置和贬值结果中扮演不同角色，导致多重均衡，且引入噪声私人信号不影响此结论，表明全球博弈的均衡唯一性结论不适用于基于市场的货币危机模型。
We develop a model of currency crises, in which traders are heterogeneously informed, and interest rates are endogenously determined in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. In our model, multiple equilibria result from distinct roles an interest rate plays in determining domestic asset market allocations and the devaluation outcome. Except for special cases, this finding is not affected by the introduction of noisy private signals. We conclude that the global games results on equilibrium uniqueness do not apply to market-based models of currency crises.