Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
提出了一个企业通过双边合同进行贸易的模型，涵盖了合同匹配和供应链匹配。研究发现，当企业关系具有供应链结构时，在特定条件下稳定分配必然存在，且经典结论如格结构、乡村医院定理等均成立。
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the presence of supply chain structure, a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences for which stable allocations are guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, the classical lattice structure, rural hospitals theorem, and one-sided strategy-proofness results all generalize to this setting.