The Spillover Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
研究反垄断执法威胁如何从一个工业子市场溢出到另一个，通过构建正式模型解释初始起诉如何揭示同一行业中的其他违规行为，并应用于高速公路建设卡特尔对制裁变化的差异化反应。
We address the question of how the threat of antitrust enforcement spills over from one industrial submarket to another. We build a formal model describing the technology through which an initial antitrust indictment can reveal evidence of additional infractions in the same industry. Our approach is organized around the belief that the flow of information on antitrust violations is closely linked to commodity flows. As it turns out, our method proves able to explain the differential response of highway construction cartels in various states to recent changes in the severity of antitrust sanctions.