Using Stock Price Information to Regulate Firms
研究股票价格信息在监管私有化企业中的作用，发现股价波动可减少监管者开发自身监控技术的动力，使其承诺轻手监管，从而保护企业成本削减投资并提高事前福利。
This paper examines the role of the information contained in stock prices in the regulation of privatized firms. Stock prices contain noisy but unbiased information about firm's future prospects that regulators can use to decide on some regulatory policies. The main argument developed is that the observation of stock price movements reduces the incentives of regulators to develop their own monitoring technologies and can allow them to commit to relatively lighthanded regulations. This protects firm's investments in cost reduction activities and can increase ex ante welfare. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.