The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Contests
研究面临收购压力的公司宣布员工持股计划对股东财富的影响，以及有/无员工持股计划的目标公司被收购的可能性。发现员工持股计划能有效阻止收购，但未显著降低股东财富。
ABSTRACT This article examines both the shareholder wealth effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) announced by firms subject to takeover pressure and the takeover incidence of targets with and without ESOPs. Although we do not find that defensive ESOPs significantly reduce shareholder wealth on average, we identify two factors—the change in managerial and employee ownership due to the ESOP and the simultaneous announcement of other defensive tactics—that are associated with negative stock price reactions. We find that ESOPs are strong deterrents to takeover. ESOP targets that are acquired earn higher returns than targets without ESOPs, but the difference is not statistically significant.