Government‐Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case
研究了1993年丹麦反垄断机构公布混凝土交易价格后，价格在一年内上涨15-20%的现象，排除了商业周期和产能限制的解释，认为价格公开反而削弱了寡头竞争，导致价格上涨。
In 1993 the Danish antitrust authority decided to gather and publish firm‐specific transactions prices for two grades of ready‐mixed concrete in three regions of Denmark. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15–20 percent within one year. We investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and/or capacity constraints, but argue that these seem to have little explanatory power. We conclude that a better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and, hence, led to increased prices contrary to the aim of the authority.