Women, Men, and Society*
运用两种谈判模型和两种道德原则，分析家庭福利在男女之间的分配，探讨女权假说与父权假说下福利与努力的差异。
SUMMARY Ideal solutions based on two bargaining models (RAIFFA, NASH) and two moral principles (Utilitarianism, RAWLS'S Difference Principle) are applied to the sharing of the welfare produced in the family between the representative man ( M ) and representative woman ( W ). The good produced by the family has a strong element of public good enjoyed by M and W . Two different assumptions are possible regarding the relative efficiency of M and W in producing the public good: (1) The feminist hypothesis: they are equally efficient, (2) The patriarchy hypothesis: men are on the average more dominant than women, and better able to hold upper positions in hierarchies. Hence they are more efficient and are entitled to status. If the feminist hypothesis is correct, M and W should, according to the ethical principles, have equal welfare and should supply equal efforts. However, the bargaining solutions generally adjudge M more welfare than W , mainly because of his higher security level. If one accepts the patriarchy hypothesis, some of the utility which M derives from his status should redound to W 's advantage (except under Utilitarianism) so that she is required to supply less effort. Paradoxically, this may mean that M should do more domestic work.