Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
分析信息约束下互补品行业的最优规制，比较捆绑供应（一体化规制）与分拆供应（分别规制）的成本与收益，发现分拆会引入类似双重加价的信息成本，其可能超过竞争带来的好处。
Optimal regulation, subject to informational constraints, is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs. An issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled. Bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry. Unbundled supply has each component regulated separately. A main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products. Unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services, but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition.