Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond
构建信号模型，说明多产品企业可用既有品牌声誉作为债券，为新体验品质量担保；虚假信号会损害所有产品声誉，从而无需过高沉没成本即可实现可信信号。
I present a signalling model in which a multiproduct firm can use its reputation as a bond for quality by using a brand name for an established product when it introduces a new experience good. As out-of-equilibrium beliefs are specified, a false signal may be taken to imply that both the established and the new product are of low quality. In contrast, the absence of a signal leaves open the possibility that one of the two products is of high quality. Hence, the signal can be credible without excessive sunk costs, as long as the bond posted is sufficiently large.