Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation
构建累积创新模型，分析法院在专利侵权案中应如何根据专利自身价值与后续改进价值来判定保护范围，并探讨允许专利持有人与改进者达成合谋协议的政策效果。
In this article, I present a model of cumulative innovation to investigate what factors should influence a court's decision when a patentee alleges that another inventor has infringed the patent with an improved version of the patented product. The model reveals how the optimal patent would extend broad protection to those inventions that have very little value (standing alone) relative to the improvements that others may subsequently invent. I also examine whether courts should allow a patentee and competing inventors with improved versions of the patented product to enter collusive agreements. The model indicates that such a policy could create incentives for inefficient entry by imitators who "invent around" the original patent.