Contestable Markets under Uncertainty
构建了一个事后可竞争的市场模型，分析企业在效率与灵活性之间的权衡，以及在位企业如何通过事前承诺影响潜在进入者的进入概率，从而内生决定市场的可竞争程度。
In this article we present a model of a market which is ex post contestable. We show that in a market characterized by uncertainty a firm will face a tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility and generally will make some precommitments to take advantage of ex ante technologies. We show that in the face of potential entry the incumbent will increase his precommitments and in so doing will affect the probability of entry. The degree of market contestability is therefore endogenously determined by the choice of precommitments. The extent to which precommitments will be used to affect entry probabilities is shown to depend on the efficiency of ex ante production, adjustment costs, and the degree of uncertainty. In particular, we show that the market becomes contestable as the relative efficiency of ex post production increases and as market conditions become more uncertain.