Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model
通过实验检验拉齐尔1979年的延迟补偿模型，考察企业能否通过承诺延迟工资来激励工人努力，并对比完全承诺、无承诺和计算机生成工资等情形，分析货币激励、社会偏好和声誉的作用。
This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relation ship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages.