Job Queues and Wages
利用求职数据研究工作队列与工资差异的关系，发现最低工资岗位吸引的求职者多于略高或略低的岗位，表明最低工资带来的租金未被非工资福利完全抵消。
This paper uses job applications data to investigate the relationship between job queues and wage differentials. The main finding is that openings for jobs that pay the minimum wage attract more job applicants than jobs that pay either slightly more or slightly less than the minimum wage. This spike in the job application rate distribution suggests that ex ante rents generated for employees by an above market-level minimum wage are not completely dissipated by reductions in nonwage benefits. In addition, we find that highly unionized firms, large firms, and firms in high-wage industries tend to receive relatively many job applicants for openings.