就业奖金与劳动力流动

Employment Bonuses and Labor Turnover

Journal of Labor Economics · 1987
被引 43
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

用美国数据检验了一个两部分的薪酬体系(固定底薪加弹性奖金)如何降低员工离职率,发现奖金在减少员工流失中起关键甚至主导作用。

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a two-part compensation system composed of a rigid base salary and a flexible bonus can reduce turnover. It is shown that bonus pay is an effective retention device if it is risk reducing and is correlated with outside contract offers. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, a model of bonus payments is tested with U.S. instead of Japanese data. The empirical results are suggestive of the conditions that give bonuses an important, even dominant, role in worker retention.

雇佣奖金劳动力流动员工保留薪酬设计