Social Security Disability Insurance: Applications, Awards, and Lifetime Income Flows
基于结构模型估计社会保障残疾保险对男性劳动力参与决策的影响，考虑终身收入框架下的机会成本和等待期抑制效应，并处理申请者自选择问题。
This article provides new evidence about the impact of Social Security Disability Insurance on male labor force participation decisions based on estimates from a structural model of applications, awards, and state-contingent lifetime income flows. The lifetime framework makes it possible to consider long-term opportunity costs associated with early labor force withdrawal and the disincentive to applications resulting from the statutory waiting period before benefits may be received. Estimation techniques account for the self-selected nature of the pool of applicants when predicting the individual-specific probability of acceptance and the opportunity costs of applying. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.