A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration
比较传统仲裁与最终报价仲裁两种机制，分析仲裁员识别信号能力高低对仲裁请求频率及结果的影响，对设计仲裁规则有参考价值。
The paper compares conventional and final-offer arbitration. One party is supposed to make a payment to another party, whose amount depends on a state. Under one scenario, parties obtain signals about the state, which cannot be recognized by the opponents. If the arbitrator's ability of recognizing signals is high, the frequency of requesting arbitration is lower under conventional than under final-offer arbitration. If this ability is low, final-offer arbitration dominates conventional arbitration in quite a similar sense. Under the second scenario, parties believe that their opponents have wrong signals. Then, conventional arbitration approximates the original outcome better than final-offer arbitration.