Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*
研究了将工作福利引入失业救济政策对福利的影响，发现要求领取失业救济者参与无报酬活动（工作福利）可能改善工人保险，实现帕累托改进。
Abstract This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.