The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen
利用货币政策反应函数，将政策意图与目标预测联系起来，分析后协议时期不同美联储主席任期的政策差异，发现伯恩斯时期结构独特，而马丁和沃尔克时期高度相似，且不同总统任期对货币政策有独立影响。
This paper utilizes a monetary policy reaction function that relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives. Estimates of this reaction function over the post-Accord period suggest that the Burns period was unique. While the Martin and Volcker periods were extremely similar, the Burns period was structurally distinct from both the Martin and Volcker periods. Further, model specifications that allow for an independent influence on monetary policy from different presidential administrations also imply that there are significant differences in monetary policy under different Fed chairmen. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.