Team Incentives for Education in Developing Countries: A Randomized Field Experiment in Benin
在贝宁通过三种低成本激励方案（个人奖励、团队绩效奖励和团队锦标赛）发现，团队激励与学生个人激励同样有效，平均效应量在0.27至0.34个标准差之间。
I examine the impact of student incentives in Benin, using three different designs that can be implemented relatively cheaply and with administrative data. The first design is a standard incentive structure where students receive monetary rewards for reaching a performance target. In the other two designs, teams of four students receive incentives based on either their performance level as a group or in a team tournament scheme. I find a large and similar average treatment effect across designs, ranging from 0.27 to 0.34 standard deviations (Standard errors do not allow to rule out that the three designs are equally effective).